Attention, les informations que vous consultez actuellement ne sont pas celles de l'année en cours. Consulter l'année universitaire 2021-2022.

UE714 - Commitment, Nudges and Incentives


Lieu et planning


  • AMSE
    AMU, 5-9 bd Maurice-Bourdet 13001 Marseille
    2nd semestre / bimensuel (indifférent), mardi 14:00-17:00
    du 28 mars 2023 au 16 mai 2023


Description


Dernière modification : 20 mai 2022 11:57

Type d'UE
Séminaires DE/MC
Disciplines
Économie, Philosophie et épistémologie
Page web
-
Langues
anglais
Mots-clés
Économie Épistémologie Histoire économique et sociale
Aires culturelles
-
Intervenant·e·s
  • Miriam Teschl [référent·e]   maîtresse de conférences, EHESS / Aix-Marseille Sciences économiques (AMSE)
  • Stéphane Luchini   chargé de recherche, CNRS / Aix-Marseille Sciences économiques (AMSE)

The general idea of the lecture is to spell out what economists usually mean by incentives and to connect it with insights from behavioral economics. The aim is to give students a better understanding about what incentives are and how incentives can shape behavior. The lecture will present theoretical arguments as well as experimental results. We will first distinguish incentives in markets from incentives to do certain sort of things in organizations. Binding incentives in markets play essentially the role of a coordination device, whereas incentives in organizations are key ingredients of contractual arrangements. Contractual arrangements have been studied extensively in the the economic theory of contracts and we will devote a special attention to moral hazard (e.g. when someone takes more risk when insured) and adverse selection (e.g. when someone can hide information about his or her type) in the principal-agent framework. Experiments will be presented to give insights on theoretical
concepts. We will also emphasize why experiments have to be set up in such a way that they are "incentive compatible", which means that they have, following Vernon Smith in particular, to fulfill three criteria: non-satiation (more payoff is always better), saliency (payoff differences must be worth it) and dominance (experimental earnings are attractive enough, that is more than opportunity costs). The next topic will be devoted to non-price incentives. There is a growing literature in economics that focuses
on the role of intrinsic motivation instead of any extrinsic motivation such as payoffs and experimental earnings, borrowing insights from cognitive and social psychology. We will present students with key ingredients from psychology and then dwell
upon two types of non-price incentives: commitment devices and nudges. The last topic will discuss incentives within the rationality and heuristics framework.

Le programme détaillé n'est pas disponible.


Master


Cette UE n'est rattachée à aucune formation de master.


Renseignements


Contacts additionnels
-
Informations pratiques
-
Direction de travaux des étudiants
-
Réception des candidats
-
Pré-requis
-

Dernière modification : 20 mai 2022 11:57

Type d'UE
Séminaires DE/MC
Disciplines
Économie, Philosophie et épistémologie
Page web
-
Langues
anglais
Mots-clés
Économie Épistémologie Histoire économique et sociale
Aires culturelles
-
Intervenant·e·s
  • Miriam Teschl [référent·e]   maîtresse de conférences, EHESS / Aix-Marseille Sciences économiques (AMSE)
  • Stéphane Luchini   chargé de recherche, CNRS / Aix-Marseille Sciences économiques (AMSE)

The general idea of the lecture is to spell out what economists usually mean by incentives and to connect it with insights from behavioral economics. The aim is to give students a better understanding about what incentives are and how incentives can shape behavior. The lecture will present theoretical arguments as well as experimental results. We will first distinguish incentives in markets from incentives to do certain sort of things in organizations. Binding incentives in markets play essentially the role of a coordination device, whereas incentives in organizations are key ingredients of contractual arrangements. Contractual arrangements have been studied extensively in the the economic theory of contracts and we will devote a special attention to moral hazard (e.g. when someone takes more risk when insured) and adverse selection (e.g. when someone can hide information about his or her type) in the principal-agent framework. Experiments will be presented to give insights on theoretical
concepts. We will also emphasize why experiments have to be set up in such a way that they are "incentive compatible", which means that they have, following Vernon Smith in particular, to fulfill three criteria: non-satiation (more payoff is always better), saliency (payoff differences must be worth it) and dominance (experimental earnings are attractive enough, that is more than opportunity costs). The next topic will be devoted to non-price incentives. There is a growing literature in economics that focuses
on the role of intrinsic motivation instead of any extrinsic motivation such as payoffs and experimental earnings, borrowing insights from cognitive and social psychology. We will present students with key ingredients from psychology and then dwell
upon two types of non-price incentives: commitment devices and nudges. The last topic will discuss incentives within the rationality and heuristics framework.

Le programme détaillé n'est pas disponible.

Cette UE n'est rattachée à aucune formation de master.

Contacts additionnels
-
Informations pratiques
-
Direction de travaux des étudiants
-
Réception des candidats
-
Pré-requis
-
  • AMSE
    AMU, 5-9 bd Maurice-Bourdet 13001 Marseille
    2nd semestre / bimensuel (indifférent), mardi 14:00-17:00
    du 28 mars 2023 au 16 mai 2023