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UE461 - Microeconomics 2: Market Equilibrium and Market Failures
Lieu et planning
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48 bd Jourdan
48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
2nd semestre / hebdomadaire, lundi 09:00-11:00
du 25 janvier 2021 au 10 mai 2021
Description
Dernière modification : 27 mai 2020 15:01
- Type d'UE
- Enseignements fondamentaux de master
- Disciplines
- Économie
- Page web
- https://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/fr/formations/masters/ape-analyse-et-politique-economiques/cursus/
- Langues
- anglais
- Mots-clés
- Économie
- Aires culturelles
- -
Intervenant·e·s
- Bernard Caillaud [référent·e] ingénieur en chef, des ponts, des eaux et des forêts / Paris School of Economics (PJSE)
- Francis Bloch professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne / Paris School of Economics (PJSE)
The fundamental welfare theorems establish the perfectly competitive case as a benchmark for thinking about outcomes in market economies. In particular, any inefficiencies that arise in a market economy, and hence any role for Pareto-improving market intervention, must be traceable to a violation of at least one of the building assumptions of the perfectly competitive case. The analysis of these market failures is the topic of this course.
The course consists in three parts. The first part covers classical market failures without informational concerns: market power, externalities and public goods. It introduces basic results and serves as an introduction to any further course in public economics and in industrial organization.
The second part is devoted to the study of informational imperfections and asymmetries as a source of inefficiencies. Starting from the failure of the competitive equilibrium paradigm in a context of informational asymmetries, it first presents central models of transaction under asymmetric information, the so-called Principal - Agent models. Moving to interactive situations with multiple agents, the course then provides an introduction to mechanism design, with applications to auctions and public good provision.
The third and last part adopts the point of view of a policy maker engaged in the design and implementation of collective decisions. The course reviews social choice theory, in particular the possibility of deriving the objectives of the policy maker as an aggregation of the preferences of the agents. Classical impossibility theorems are studied (Arrow, Gibbard-Satterthwaite) and positive results are discussed, e.g. in the context of voting. Finally, since the policy maker rarely knows individuals’ preferences, the theory of implementation is presented, making the link with the previous part on mechanism design.
Le programme détaillé n'est pas disponible.
Master
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Séminaires de tronc commun
– Analyse et politique économiques
– M1/S2
Suivi et validation – semestriel hebdomadaire = 6 ECTS
MCC – examen, contrôle continu
Renseignements
- Contacts additionnels
- -
- Informations pratiques
Mentions APE et PPD, secrétariat pédagogique, 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris, tél. : 01 80 52 19 43/44. Pour tout renseignement, veuillez écrire à master-ape@psemail.eu
Horaires ouverture bureau : du lundi au mardi de 15 h 30 à 17h30 et du jeudi au vendredi de 10 h à 12 h 30.
Le syllabus et le planning du cours seront disponibles sur le site Internet :
https://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/fr/formations/masters/ape-analyse-et-politique-economiques/
- Direction de travaux des étudiants
- -
- Réception des candidats
- -
- Pré-requis
- -
Dernière modification : 27 mai 2020 15:01
- Type d'UE
- Enseignements fondamentaux de master
- Disciplines
- Économie
- Page web
- https://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/fr/formations/masters/ape-analyse-et-politique-economiques/cursus/
- Langues
- anglais
- Mots-clés
- Économie
- Aires culturelles
- -
Intervenant·e·s
- Bernard Caillaud [référent·e] ingénieur en chef, des ponts, des eaux et des forêts / Paris School of Economics (PJSE)
- Francis Bloch professeur des universités, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne / Paris School of Economics (PJSE)
The fundamental welfare theorems establish the perfectly competitive case as a benchmark for thinking about outcomes in market economies. In particular, any inefficiencies that arise in a market economy, and hence any role for Pareto-improving market intervention, must be traceable to a violation of at least one of the building assumptions of the perfectly competitive case. The analysis of these market failures is the topic of this course.
The course consists in three parts. The first part covers classical market failures without informational concerns: market power, externalities and public goods. It introduces basic results and serves as an introduction to any further course in public economics and in industrial organization.
The second part is devoted to the study of informational imperfections and asymmetries as a source of inefficiencies. Starting from the failure of the competitive equilibrium paradigm in a context of informational asymmetries, it first presents central models of transaction under asymmetric information, the so-called Principal - Agent models. Moving to interactive situations with multiple agents, the course then provides an introduction to mechanism design, with applications to auctions and public good provision.
The third and last part adopts the point of view of a policy maker engaged in the design and implementation of collective decisions. The course reviews social choice theory, in particular the possibility of deriving the objectives of the policy maker as an aggregation of the preferences of the agents. Classical impossibility theorems are studied (Arrow, Gibbard-Satterthwaite) and positive results are discussed, e.g. in the context of voting. Finally, since the policy maker rarely knows individuals’ preferences, the theory of implementation is presented, making the link with the previous part on mechanism design.
Le programme détaillé n'est pas disponible.
-
Séminaires de tronc commun
– Analyse et politique économiques
– M1/S2
Suivi et validation – semestriel hebdomadaire = 6 ECTS
MCC – examen, contrôle continu
- Contacts additionnels
- -
- Informations pratiques
Mentions APE et PPD, secrétariat pédagogique, 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris, tél. : 01 80 52 19 43/44. Pour tout renseignement, veuillez écrire à master-ape@psemail.eu
Horaires ouverture bureau : du lundi au mardi de 15 h 30 à 17h30 et du jeudi au vendredi de 10 h à 12 h 30.
Le syllabus et le planning du cours seront disponibles sur le site Internet :
https://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/fr/formations/masters/ape-analyse-et-politique-economiques/
- Direction de travaux des étudiants
- -
- Réception des candidats
- -
- Pré-requis
- -
-
48 bd Jourdan
48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
2nd semestre / hebdomadaire, lundi 09:00-11:00
du 25 janvier 2021 au 10 mai 2021