UE256 - Political Economics 2 : Conflict, Institutions, Media, and Governance — Part I : Institutions, Media, and Governance (Économie politique II : Conflits, institutions, médias et gouvernance — Partie I : Institutions, médias et gouvernance)

Intervenant·e·s

• Ekaterina Zhuravskaya [référent·e]   directrice d'études, EHESS / Paris School of Economics (PJSE)

Version française : Ce cours optionnel de deuxième année de master (M2). Il introduit les étudiants à la littérature contemporaine en économie politique des institutions, des médias, des conflits et des migrations, avec un accent particulier sur les méthodes empiriques utilisées dans la recherche appliquée. La première partie du cours (18h) se concentre sur les institutions politiques, la gouvernance et les médias, en mettant l’accent sur les mécanismes de responsabilité politique et leurs effets économiques.

Thème I : Responsabilité politique et institutions
Le cours étudie les institutions politiques au sein des pays — élections versus nominations, limitation des mandats — et leur impact sur les politiques publiques et les performances économiques. Il analyse également les effets des institutions entre pays, notamment les constitutions, les règles électorales et les formes de gouvernement.

Thème II : Les médias comme institution de responsabilité et de persuasion
Les médias sont étudiés à la fois comme un mécanisme de contrôle des gouvernants et comme un instrument de persuasion politique. Le cours présente les avancées récentes en économie politique des médias, en s’appuyant sur des travaux empiriques de pointe.

Thème III : Internet et médias sociaux
Le cours examine les effets politiques d’Internet et des réseaux sociaux, notamment leur impact sur la confiance dans les institutions, la mobilisation politique (y compris les manifestations) et la diffusion de l’information et de la désinformation.

Thème IV : Régulation et corruption
Les étudiants analysent les déterminants de la réglementation, le rôle de la défiance et les mécanismes de corruption. Le cours met en évidence le lien entre corruption, cycles politiques et résultats économiques, ainsi que l’efficacité des politiques de lutte contre la corruption.

Dans l’ensemble, le cours fournit aux étudiants une compréhension rigoureuse, fondée sur des données empiriques, des interactions entre institutions politiques, médias et gouvernance, et prépare l’étude des thèmes complémentaires de conflits et de migrations.


English version: This second-year master’s (M2) elective course introduces students to the literature in the political economy of institutions, media, conflict, and migration, with a strong emphasis on empirical methods used in applied research. The first part of the course (18 hours) focuses on political institutions, governance, and media, highlighting the mechanisms of political accountability and their economic consequences.

Theme I: Political accountability and institutions
The course examines political institutions within countries—elections versus appointments and term limits—and their impact on policy choices and economic outcomes. It also studies cross-country institutional differences, including constitutions, electoral rules, and forms of government.

Theme II: Media as an institution of accountability and persuasion
Media are analyzed both as a mechanism of political accountability and as a tool of political persuasion. The course presents state-of-the-art research in the political economy of media, grounded in rigorous empirical evidence.

Theme III: Internet and social media
The course explores the political effects of the internet and social media, including their impact on trust in government, political mobilization (including protest participation), and the spread of information and misinformation.

Theme IV: Regulation and corruption
Students analyze the determinants of regulation, the role of distrust, and the mechanisms of corruption. The course highlights the links between corruption, political cycles, and economic outcomes, as well as the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies.

Overall, the course provides a rigorous, empirically grounded understanding of how political institutions, media, and governance shape economic outcomes, and prepares students for the study of related topics such as conflict and migration.

Political Economics 2: Political institutions, media, conflict, and migration

This course introduces students to the literature on the political economy of media, violent conflict, and migration. It provides an overview of the literature on these topics, but also treats a limited set of core readings in detail, with particular focus on the empirical techniques used in applied research in this area. These readings are indicated with a star.

--Part I: Political Institutions and media (18h)

The first part of the course introduces students to state-of-the-art research in topics of political accountability, governance, and institutions, with a special focus on the political economy of media and social media. It precedes the two other topics: political economy of migration and of conflicts. In particular, it studies the following topics: Political institutions and political accountability and representation. Economic effects of political institutions within countries: elections vs. appointments and term limits. Economic effects of political institutions across countries: constitutions, electoral rules and forms government. Media as an institution of political accountability. Media as an instrument of political persuasion. Political effects of the internet and social media. Political economy of regulation and corruption.

Professor:

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (EHESS), office R6-11 (Campus Jourdan), Email: ezhuravskaya(at)gmail.com

Office hours : via zoom or in office by appointment. Please email ezhuravskaya(at)gmail.com with subject “APE-PPD STUDENT: REQUEST MEETING”

Readings:

1.     Political accountability. Political institutions within countries: elections vs. appointments and term limits

*  Besley, T., Case, A., (1995) "Does Political Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence From Gubernatorial Limits," Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(3):769-98.

*  Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, (2003). "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, 09.

Besley, T., Case, A., (2003) "Political institutions and policy choices: Evidence from the United States", Journal of Economic Literature 41:7-73.

Akhmedov, A., Zhuravskaya, E. (2004) "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting," Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(4):1301-1338.

Besley, T. and Burgess, R. (2002), “The political economy of government responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1415-1452.

Alesina, Alberto and Tabellini, Guido (2007) "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task" American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, 169-179.

Alesina, Alberto and Tabellini, Guido (2008) “Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks” Journal of Public Economics, Volume 92, Issues 3–4, April 2008, Pages 426-447

Adiguzel, Kaba, Koyuncu (2024)  “From Elected to Appointed: The Economic Consequences of Local Authoritarian Takeovers” mimeo

Hansen and Jensen (2025)  “Left in Charge: Political Rule and the Rise of Local Welfare” mimeo

2.  Economic Effects of Constitutions

*  Acemoglu, D. (2005) "Constitutions, politics and economic growth: A review essay on Persson and Tabellini's "The Economic Effects of Constitutions", Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLIII (December 2005), pp. 1025-1048.

*  Gagliarducci, Nannicini, Naticchioni (2011) "Electoral Rules and Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test", American Economic Journal: Economic Policy: Vol. 3, No. 3, 2011

(pp. 144-74).

*  Trebbi, Francesco, Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, 2008. "Electoral Rules and Minority Representation in U.S. Cities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 123(1), pages 325-357, 02.

Torsten Persson, 2005. "Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development," NBER Working Papers 11171, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Persson, T., Tabellini, G. (2003) "The Economic Effects of Constitutions: What Do the Data Say?" MIT Press, Ch. 3-9.

Persson, T., Tabellini, G. (2004) "Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes", American Economic Review 94:25-46.

Persson, T., Tabellini, G. (2004) "Constitutions and economic policy", Journal of Economic Perspectives 18:75-98.

Funk, P. and Gathmann, C. (2013), HOW DO ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AFFECT FISCAL POLICY?

EVIDENCE FROM CANTONAL PARLIAMENTS, 1890–2000. Journal of the European

Economic Association, 11: 1178-1203.

Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, Georgy Egorov, Ruben Enikolopov “Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 83, Issue 3, July 2016, Pages 932–968, https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdw018.

3.  Media as an institution of political accountability. Media as an instrument of political persuasion.

*  Snyder, James M. and David Stromberg, “Press Coverage and Political Accountability,” Journal of Political Economy, 04 2010, 118 (2), 355–408.

*  Adena, Maja, Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, Veronica Santarosa, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya ”Radio and the Rise of The Nazis in Prewar Germany” Quarterly Journal of Economics (2015) 130 (4): 1885-1939.

*  Martin, Gregory J. and Yurukoglu, Ali (2017) "Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and

Polarization" AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW VOL. 107, NO. 9, SEPTEMBER 2017 (pp. 2565-99)

DellaVigna, S., and M. Gentzkow (2010) “Persuasion: Empirical Evidence,” Annual Review of Economics.Vol. (2):643-669.

DellaVigna, S. and E. Kaplan (2007). The Fox News effect: Media bias and voting. Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(3), 807-860.

Enikolopov, Ruben, & Maria Petrova & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2011. "Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3253-85, December.

Prat, Andrea and David Strömberg 2013 "The Political Economy of Mass Media" Advances in Economics and Econometrics. Cambridge University Press. 2013.

DellaVigna, Stefano, Ruben Enikolopov, Vera Mironova, Maria Petrova and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya “Cross-Border Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics Vol. 6 No. 3 (July 2014) (pp. 103-32)

Reinikka, Ritva and Jakob Svensson 2011 “The power of information in public services: Evidece from education in Uganda” Journal of Public Economics, Volume 95, Issues 7–8, August 2011, pp. 956- 966.

Reinikka, Ritva and Jakob Svensson 2005 “Fighting Corruption To Improve Schooling: Evidence From A Newspaper Campaign In Uganda” Journal of the European Economic Association, 3: 259-267.

Martin, Gregory J. and Ali Yurukoglu (2017) "Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and Polarization," American Economic Review, 107 (9), pp. 2565-99.

4.  Political effects of the internet and social media

*  Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, Maria Petrova, and Ruben Enikolopov (2020). “Political Effects of the Internet and Social Media.” Annual Review of Economics. DOI/10.1146/annurev-economics-081919- 050239. Vol. 12, pp. 415-438.

*  Aridor, Jiménez-Durán, Levy, and Song. 2024. "The Economics of Social Media." Journal of Economic Literature 62 (4): 1422–74.

*  Guriev, Sergei ® Nikita Melnikov ® Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2021) “3G Internet and Confidence in Government,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 136, Issue 4, November 2021, Pages 2533–2613.

*  Enikolopov, Ruben, Maria Petrova, Alexei Makarin. “Social Media and Protest Participation: Evidence from Russia” Econometrica, Vol. 88, No. 4 (July, 2020), 1479–1514.

Manacorda, Marco and Andrea Tesei, “Liberation Technology: Mobile Phones and Political Mobilization in Africa”, Econometrica, Vol. 88, No. 2, p. 533-567.

Oscar Barrera, Emeric Henry, Sergei Guriev, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2020) “Facts, Alternative Facts, and Fact Checking in Times of Post-Truth Politics,” Journal of Public Economics, 182: 104123.

Emeric Henry ® Ekaterina Zhuravskaya ® Sergei Guriev (2022) “Checking and sharing Alt-Facts,” Americal Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 14(3): 55–86.

Vosoughi, Soroush, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral. 2018. “The spread of true and false news online.” Science, 359: 1146–1151.

Grinberg, Nir, Kenneth Joseph, Lisa Friedland, Briony Swire-Thompson, and David Lazer. 2019. “Fake News on Twitter during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.” Science, 363(6425): 374–378.

Guess, Andrew, Jonathan Nagler, and Joshua Tucker. 2019. “Less than You Think: Prevalence and Predictors of Fake News Dissemination on Facebook.” Science Advances, 5(1): eaau4586.

5.  Understanding regulation and corruption

*  Aghion, Philippe & Yann Algan & Pierre Cahuc & Andrei Shleifer, 2010. "Regulation and Distrust," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1015-1049, August.

*  Shleifer, Andrei. 2005. “Understanding Regulation.” European Financial Management 11 (4): 439-451.

*  Djankov, S., Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., ‘The new comparative economics’, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 31, 2003b, pp. 595–619.

Fisman, Raymond and Edward Miguel. (2007). “Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets”, Journal of Political Economy, 115(6), 1020-1048.

Mironov, Maxim and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya “Corruption in Procurement and the Political Cycle in Tunneling: Evidence from Financial Transactions Data” (2016) American Economic Journal: Economic Policy

Do and Campante (2014) “Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from US States”, American Economic Review, Vol 108, No. 8, pp. 2456-81.

Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan (2011). “Electoral accountability and corruption: Evidence from the audit if local governments.” American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol.

101(4), pages 1274-1311, June.

Olken, Benjamin A. 2007. “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia.” Journal of Political Economy 115:200–249.

Bertrand, Marianne, Simeon Djankov, Rema Hanna and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2007. “Obtaining a Driver’s License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(4):1639–1676.

--Part II: Conflict (7h)

Professor:

Oliver Vanden Eynde

 Email: olivervandeneynde(at)gmail.com

Office hours : via link on course website.

Background reading: Rohner, Dominic. 2024. The Peace Formula. Cambridge University Press.

0. Rationalising civil war

Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organiza- tion, 49, 379-414.

1. The consequences of civil war

Bundervoet, Tom, Philip Verwimp, and Richard Akresh. 2009. “Health and Civil War in Rural Burundi.” Journal of Human Resources.

Bellows, J. and Edward Miguel. 2006. “War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone." Journal of Public Economics, Volume 93, Issues 11–12, December 2009, Pages 1144–115 3

Bauer, Michal, Christopher Blattman, Julie Chytilová, Joseph Henrich, Edward Miguel, Tamar Mitts. 2016. textquotedblleftCan War Foster Cooperation? ", Journal of Eco- nomic Perspectives.

Couttenier, Petruncu, Rohner, and Thoenig. 2019. “The Violent Legacy of Conflict: Evidence from Asylum Seekers, Crime, and Public Policy in Switzerland", American Economic Review.

2. Opportunity costs

Miguel, Edward, Shankar Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti.  2004.  “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach.” Journal of Political Econ- omy, 112, 725-753.

Ciccone, Antonio. 2011. “Estimating the Effect of Transitory Economic Shocks on Civil Conflict”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics.

* Dube, Oeindrilla and Juan F. Vargas. 2013. “Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia.” Review of Economic Studies.

Burke, Marshall, Solomon M. Hsiang, Edward Miguel. 2015. “Climate and Conflict.” Annual Review of Economics.

3. Ethnic Diversity and Conflict

Montalvo, J. and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2005. “Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict and Civil War.” American Economic Review, 95, 796-816.

Michalopoulos, Stelios, and Elias Papaioannou. 2016. “The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa.” American Economic Review.

Bazzi, Samuel and Matthew Gudgeon, 2020. “The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions”, AEJ:Applied Economics.

Campante, Felipe, Depetris-Chauvin, Emilio and Durante, Ruben, 2020. “Building Nations through Shared Experiences: Evidence from African Football”, American Eco- nomic Review.

Grosfeld, Irena, and Seyhun Orcan Sakalli, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2019. “Mid- dleman Minorities and Ethnic Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms in the Russian Empire”. Review of Economic Studies.

4. Information and civilian participation

Berman, Eli, Joseph Felter and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2011. “Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” Journal of Political Economy.

* Vanden Eynde, Oliver. 2018. “Targets of Violence: Evidence from India’s Naxalite Conflict.”, Economic Journal.

Yanagizawa-Drot, David, 2014. “Propaganda and Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide”, Quarterly Journal of Economics.

5. Development interventions in conflict zones

Crost, B., Felter, J., and Johnston, P. (2014). ‘Aid under Fire:  Development Projects and Civil Conflict’, American Economic Review, vol. 104(6), pp. 1833-1856.

Crost B., J. Felter and P. Johnston. (2016). ‘Conditional Cash Transfers, Civil Conflict and Insurgent Influence: Experimental Evidence from the Philippines’, Journal of Development Economics, 118: 171-182.

Blatmann, Christopher, Jamison, Julian, and Sheridan, 2020. “ Reducing Crime and Violence: Experimental Evidence from Cognitive Behavioral Therapy in Liberia ’, American Economic Review.

Fetzer, Thiemo, 2020. “ Can Workfare Programs Moderate Violence? Evidence from India ’, Journal of the European Economic Association.

* McGuirk, Eoin, and Nathan Nunn. 2014. “ Development Mismatch? Evidence from Agricultural Projects in Pastoral Africa ”. Working Paper.

6. Nation building in conflict zones

* Condra, Luke N., James D. Long, Andrew C. Shaver, Austin L. Wright, 2017. “The Logic of Insurgent Electoral Violence”, American Economic Review.

Fetzer, Thiemo, Pedro C.L. Souza, Austin L. Wright, Oliver Vanden Eynde, 2021 “Security Transitions.”, American Economic Review.

Shapiro, Jacob N., and Oliver Vanden Eynde, 2021. “ Fiscal Incentives for Conflict: Evidence from India’s Red Corridor.”, Review of Economics and Statistics.

* Dell, Melissa, and Pablo Querubin, 2018. “ Nation Building Through Foreign Inter- vention: Evidence from Discontinuities in Military Strategies ”, Quarterly Journal of Economics.

--Part III: Migration (12h)

Professor:

Hillel Rapoport

 Email: hillel.rapoport@psemail.eu

office hours: appointments to be arranged by email.

A.    Immigration, voting and populism

Immigration: salience and activation; the contact hypothesis; immigration and far-right voting.

Readings

Colussi, Tommaso, Ingo Isphording and Nico Pestel, 2021. “Minority Salience and Political Extremism”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 13, 3: 237-71.

Docquier, Frederic, Stefano Iandolo, Hillel Rapoport, Riccardo Turati and Gonzague Vanoorenberghe (2024): “Populism and the skill-content of globalization”, CEPR Working Paper.

Halla, M. and Wagner, A., and Zweimuller, J. (2017). Immigration and voting for the far right. Journal of the European Economic Association. 15 (6), 1341–1385.

Ochsner, C. and F. Roesel (2023): “Activated History: The Case of the Turkish Sieges of Vienna”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, forthcoming.

Steinmayr, Andreas (2021): “Contact Matters: Exposure to Refugees and Voting for the Far-Right”, Review of Economics and Statistics. 103(2): 310–327.

B.    Migration and cultural change

Migration and cultural change; cultural selection and “exit”; do immigrants disseminate their culture to the host societies?

Readings

Barsbai, Toman and Hillel Rapoport (2024). Exit and Voice: Germany, 1848-1933. Mimeo.

Bazzi, S., A. Ferrara, M. Fiszbein, T. Pearson and P. Testa, 2023. “The Confederate Diaspora”, NBER Working Paper No 31331.

Giuliano, Paola, and Marco Tabellini, 2020. "The Seeds of Ideology: Historical Immigration and Political Preferences in the United States." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 20-118, May. (Revised June 2023).

Karadja, Mounir and Erik Prawitz (2019): Exit, Voice and Political Change: Evidence from Swedish Mass Migration to the United States, Journal of Political Economy.

Knudsen, Anne Sofie, 2019. Those Who Stayed: Selection and Cultural Change during the Age of Mass Migration. Mimeo., Lund University.

https://annesofiebeckknudsen.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/thosewhostayed.pdf

Michaeli, Moti, Casari, Marco, Andrea Ichino, Maria De Paola and Vincenzo Scoppa, 2023. Civicness Drain. The Economic Journal, 133: 649, January.

Miho, A., A. Jarotschkin and K. Zhuravskaya, 2024. “Diffusion of Gender Norms: Evidence from Stalin's Ethnic Deportations.” Journal of the European Economic Association.

Rapoport, Hillel, Sulin Sardoschau and Arthur Silve, 2021. Migration and Cultural Change, IZA Discussion Paper No 14772, October.

C.    Migration, redistribution and global justice

Readings

Alesina, Alberto, Elie Murard and Hillel Rapoport (2021): “Immigration and preferences for redistribution in Europe”, Journal of Economic Geography.

Alesina, Alberto, Armando Miano and Stefanie Stancheva, 2023: “Immigration and redistribution”, The Review of Economic Studies, 90, 1: 1–39.

Clemens, Michael and Lant Pritchett (2008): Income per natural: measuring development for people rather than places, Population and Development Review.

Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, Jesus, and Hillel Rapoport (2014): Tradable immigration quotas, Journal of Public Economics.

Fleurbaey, Marc et Hillel Rapoport (2020) : Migration et justice globale (entretien), Regards Croisés sur l’Economie, 27, 2 : 161-170.

Rodrik, Dani (2017): Is global equality the ennemy of national equality?, Mimeo, Harvard Kennedy School. https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/is_global_equality_the_enemy_of_national_equality.pdf